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Abstract: Cloud Computing is a computing model that allows ubiquitous, convenient and on-demand
access to a shared pool of highly configurable resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications
and services). Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are serious
threats to the Cloud services’ availability due to numerous new vulnerabilities introduced by the
nature of the Cloud, such as multi-tenancy and resource sharing. In this paper, new types of DoS and
DDoS attacks in Cloud Computing are explored, especially the XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS attacks,
and some possible detection and mitigation techniques are examined. This survey also provides
an overview of the existing defense solutions and investigates the experiments and metrics that are
usually designed and used to evaluate their performance, which is helpful for the future research in
the domain.
Keywords: cloud computing; denial-of-service; security; countermeasures
1. Introduction
Cloud Computing includes both what is delivered as a service over the internet and the hardware
behind those services. Resources can be provisioned and released very easily, requiring little if any
intervention from the provider. From the user’s point of view, Cloud infrastructures seem to provide
infinite resources, which can be adapted to one’s needs. For example, a small start-up company may
lack the need or the financial resources required to buy many computing resources, but may want to
leave its options open for a future expansion, if successful, making Cloud Computing particularly
appropriate in such a case. In this context, the company would simply pay for what is actually used
given that resources can be released when they are no longer required.
In a Cloud network, users do not own the computing servers. They can access numerous services
without the burden of Cloud management and their data can be accessed by way of many devices
(such as smart phones, sensors, tablets, etc.).
More generally, the main features of Cloud Computing are the following [1]:
1. Large-Scale: to satisfy the customers’ demands, companies like Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, Yahoo and
Google own hundreds of thousands of distributed servers.
2. Resource pooling: providers serve multiple customers with provisional and scalable services.
These services can be transparently adjusted to the clients’ needs.
3. Ubiquitous network access: users can access services anywhere, through any kind of terminal.
4. Rapid elasticity: users can increase and release their requests quickly and dynamically.
5. On-demand self-service: since a Cloud infrastructure is a large pool of resources, users can buy
according to their needs. The provider automatically supplies services and associates resources to
the Cloud user, as requested.
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6. High extensibility: the scale of a Cloud infrastructure can be extended to meet the increasing
requirements of customers.
Security in Cloud Computing is critical when developing services. Updating the operating
systems of virtual machines, ensuring availability, isolating users’ individual data, implementing
authentication mechanisms, encryption or configuring VPN and VLAN are but a few examples of
what needs to be considered [2]. Here is a list of the security aspects that challenge Cloud Computing.
1. Identity, Authentication, Authorization
Identity enables characterizing a user through the use of a login. Authentication is used to
verify the user’s credentials. This is done in a secure, trustworthy and manageable manner [3].
When authentication is complete, the Cloud authorization verifies the user’s rights. Guidance
includes a centralized directory, identity management, privileged user and access management,
role-based access control and separation of duties among main features. In addition, the service
provider can frequently offer a free trial period. For example, in the summer of 2012, attackers
(users for a free period) accessed Mat Hona’s data (writer for Wired Magazine) Apple, Gmail and
Twitter accounts [3]. They erased all his personal data in those accounts.
2. Confidentiality
A malicious attacker in a virtual machine can listen to another virtual machine [4]. An attacker can
very easily identify the data center of the Virtual Machine (VM) and can also obtain information
about the IP address and the domain name of the data center. In addition, a VM can extract private
cryptographic keys being used in other VMs on the same physical server, which subsequently
implies the risk of data leakage [3]. It is thus important to protect the confidentiality of VM data.
For example, the Amazon EC2 platform (Seattle, Washington, WA, USA) [5] was vulnerable to
confidentiality issues [4]. However, now, with Amazon Web Service (AWS), the client has the
option to manage their own encryption keys [6].
3. Integrity
Phishing, fraud and exploitation of software vulnerabilities, traffic hijacking can eavesdrop
activities and transactions, manipulate data, return falsified information and redirect clients to
illegitimate sites. Similarly, weak interfaces and Application Program Interface APIs cannot
protect users from accidental or malicious attempts [3]. For example, Hewlett-Packard ( Palo Alto,
California, CA, USA) proposes an Integrity Virtual Machines Architecture [7].
4. Isolation
Cloud Computing must have a level of isolation among all the VM data and the hypervisor [8,9].
In Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), it means isolating VMs’ storage, processing memory and access
path networks. In Platform as a Service (PaaS): running services and API calls must be isolated.
Moreover, in Software as a Service (SaaS): isolation amongst transactions must be achieved.
5. Availability
Illegitimate users consume much of the victim’s processing power, memory, disk space or
network bandwidth. It also causes system slowdowns, which prevents legitimate users from
using the service. Consequently, the VM becomes unavailable, causing a Denial of Service
(DoS) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). For example, a DDoS attack with compromised
Internet of Things devices happen on Dyn (DNS infrastructure) [10] and paralysed some cloud
computing-based sites such as GitHub and Airbnb [11].
This survey focuses on DoS and DDoS attacks and defenses applied to Cloud Computing
availability. It will demonstrate that DoS and DDoS attacks (specifically XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS)
present a serious threat to Cloud Computing, with many vulnerabilities, originating from various types
of attacks and attackers, the latter originating from various types of attacks and attackers. This paper
presents the design experiment and the metrics used to evaluate DoS and DDoS defenses.
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Our contributions to this survey are to present the following:
• DoS and DDoS attacks targeting Cloud availability;
• a description of the specific XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS attacks;
• the defenses applied to DoS and DDoS attacks in Cloud Computing;
• the specific defenses against XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS attacks;
• a summary of how to evaluate such defenses.
So far, the features of Cloud Computing and certain security aspects were presented. The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the work related to the classification of security
issues, Section 3 identifies the possible attacks and attackers, Section 4 focuses more specifically on DoS
and DDoS applied to Cloud Computing and Section 5 examines possible detections and mitigations
of DoS and DDoS attacks. Furthermore, Section 6 identifies the experimentation and the metrics to
evaluate the defenses and Section 7 offers conclusions.
2. Related Work
The new paradigm introduced by Cloud Computing creates new security challenges. Therefore,
a number of scientific contributions were made in this field during the past few years. Much work has
been done to identify threats and vulnerabilities and new frameworks and strategies were created to
address such problems. Furthermore, these security concerns are likely to increase in the coming years
due to the progressive migration of companies and individuals to Cloud infrastructures. The following
is a review of some of the Cloud security surveys that were recently published.
Grobauer et al. [12] exposes vulnerabilities associated with Cloud Computing. For example,
the vulnerabilities are (1) VM escape; (2) session riding and hijacking; (3) insecure or obsolete
cryptography; (4) unauthorized access to management interface; (5) Internet protocol vulnerabilities
and (6) data recovery vulnerability. The authors specify that the current security metrics are not
adapted to Cloud infrastructures, so that new metrics standards must be developed for greater
security. Although they clarify indicators of Cloud-specific vulnerabilities, no solutions are presented
to solve them.
Gonzalez et al. [9] identify, classify, organize and quantify the security taxonomy-architecture:
network configuration, hosts and virtualization issues, applications and services, data security and
storage, security management as well as identities and access to Cloud Computing. In addition,
the authors present security concerns and solutions using pie charts in order to show the
representativeness of each group with identified references. They identify that the security problems
associated with virtualization are the most seriously evaluated at 12%, but the research on solutions
for this aspect is only 3%. They propose developing new mechanisms to isolate VMs, since proper
isolation between VM must be implemented to avoid cross-VM attacks due to the sharing of hardware
(CPU, storage, memory, etc.). Firewalls protect the provider’s internal Cloud infrastructure against
insiders and outsiders, while enabling VM isolation and fine-grained filtering of addresses and ports,
thus preventing DoS and DDoS attacks.
Khorshed et al. [13] organized Cloud Computing security into three sections: security categories
(Cloud providers or Cloud customers), security in service delivery models : SaaS, PaaS, IaaS and
security dimensions. They present a survey on the top threats for Cloud Computing and an attack
detection for Cloud Computing using machine learning techniques.
Hashizume et al. [8] identify, classify, analyze and list a number of vulnerabilities, threats,
mechanisms, security standards, data security, trust, security requirements for the SaaS, PaaS and IaaS
delivery models of Cloud Computing. The paper enumerates the threats in detail: service hijacking,
stolen data, DoS (and DDoS) and VM related issues.
Khalil et al. [14] classify Cloud security threats into five categories: Security Standards, Network,
Access Control, Cloud Infrastructure and Data. They compare and analyse only countermeasures such
as Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Identity Management Systems (IMS).
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Ali et al. [15] present the cloud security challenges at the communication level (between customers
and cloud, communication occurring within cloud infrastructure), for Virtual machines. They discuss
various approaches proposed in the literature to counter the security issues. Using tables, they indicate
the security features for each countermeasure scheme.
Masdari et al. [16] presents a study of the types of DoS attacks with the new attacks against virtual
machines and hypervisors in cloud computing environment. Furthermore, the authors also enumerate
well known network defense and cloud computing defense against Denial of Service attacks.
Osanaiye et al. [17] survey DDoS attacks targeting cloud computing. They categorize attacks into
application-bug level and infrastructural level and present the various tools to conduct these attacks.
The features of Cloud Computing (large scale, direct access to Cloud infrastructures, resource
sharing, etc.) need new and innovative solutions to protect both the users and the provider.
Depending on the Cloud model, security relies on the provider or on the user.
As mentioned above, Cloud Computing security is now well documented. Our survey
investigates DoS and DDoS attacks specifically targeting the availability of Cloud Computing and the
defense. In the following sections, for the cloud computing, our paper will present the types of attacks
and attackers, the DoS and DDoS attacks, the defenses and the evaluation defense systems.
3. Attacks and Attackers
Before dealing with possible detections and mitigations of attacks on Cloud Computing, the kinds
of attacks and the types of attackers that are actually a threat to Cloud Computing shall be addressed.
We shall first focus on the various forms an attack can take. There are multiple scenarios involved in
the Cloud infrastructure itself and its environment.
In a DDoS attack, some hosts (VM, PC or laptops), also called “bots” or “zombies”, can be controlled
remotely. A collection of such bots controlled by a master entity (attacker) is known as a “botnet”.
The typical attackers will be classified into three categories, according to their location,
their motivation or their level of activity in the attack.
3.1. Attack
Cloud Computing infrastructures can be compromised in three ways: the attack can come from
the outside and the target be inside (external to internal), it can even originate from within the system
(internal to internal) and it can even occur from within to target the outside of the infrastructure [18].
• External to internal. In such a case, the botnet used to perform the attack comes from outside
the target system. The attack can target the internet gateway of the Cloud infrastructure, or the
servers. If a particular client (in a VM) becomes the victim of an attack, it will also affect the other
VMs present on the same physical server of the Cloud (performance interference between VMs).
• Internal to external. In such a case, the attack begins by taking ownership of a VM running in the
Cloud. This can be done with a Trojan horse. The choice of which customer’s VM to infect is
important because if this customer owns a large number of VMs, the Trojan horse can potentially
spread over all those VMs, therefore forming a botnet. The great computing power and resource
availability of the Cloud becomes a real threat for an external target.
• Internal to internal. In the Cloud infrastructure, an internal botnet is formed and can attack another
target inside the system (such as a VM or a group of VM). All Cloud infrastructures may break
down under these kinds of attacks.
With the different kinds of attacks come different types of attackers. Indeed, each attack scenario
corresponds to a particular attacker with a specific location and goals.
3.2. Attacker
The scope of an attack may greatly vary, depending on who perpetrates the attack.
System administrators take the appropriate actions: to exclude or to ensure a quick recovery and allow
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subsequent investigations. Raya and Hubaux [19] identify four categories of attackers that we will
describe in the context of cloud computing.
• Insider vs. Outsider. In such a case, the insider belongs to the network that is under attack: he is
an authenticated user with privileged access to critical data. Of course, the insider can do more harm
than the outsider since the latter would be considered an intruder from the network perspective.
Moreover, he would have fewer resources to begin an attack. In the case of Cloud Computing,
an insider could be an employee of the Cloud infrastructure, or someone controlling one or several
VMs inside the Cloud network, whereas an outsider would not be part of the network at all.
For example, an insider attacker may be able to execute arbitrary commands on the behalf of a
legitimate Cloud user, thus performing a DoS or DDoS on the user’s services or to create a botnet
for charging the Amazon Elastic Cloud Computing costs on the user’s invoice [20].
• Malicious or Rational. Malicious attackers have a general goal of harming the network or the
network users (employees or customers of the network). Whatever the costs or the consequences,
all means can be deployed to achieve his goal and such attackers are usually harder to stop or to
track since no logic is involved. On the contrary, rational attackers can be more predictable in the
way the attacks are led and which specific targets are reached. Consider the example of a DoS
attack in Cloud Computing: a malicious attacker may want to destabilize an organization without
any claim or consistent reasons to motivate his actions: he simply wants to be famous. However,
a rational attacker could be a competitor desiring to create a commercial threat or an organisation
leading a DoS or DDoS against a company or a government for ideological reasons.
• Active vs. Passive. Active attackers lead attacks by consciously or unconsciously sending packets
or signals while passive attackers may simply eavesdrop. Victims may not even be aware that
their machine is under the control of a master machine that forces it to contribute to the attack
(a botnet is such an example). In DoS and DDoS attacks, this defines the difference between the
zombies and the master entity (active attacker): both participate in the attack, but zombies are
never aware that they are vehiculing an attack. In the context of Cloud Computing, an active
attacker would have taken control of one or several VMs inside the Cloud network, for instance,
and would send huge amounts of traffic or malformed packets to a specific host or subnet in the
network. Hence, a legitimate user such as a zombie whose VM was taken over by a master attacker,
also performs the attack. A passive attacker consists on sniffing traffic to discover vulnerable
links for future exploitations. In addition, passive attackers may launch eavesdropping attacks to
capture the communication.
• Local vs. Extended. The scope of the attacker depends on the number of machines he can control.
More than just a number, it really is about how those machines are linked together and scattered
across the network. An attacker controlling thousands of machines outside the cloud to perpetrate
a DoS or DDoS would be considered an extended attacker. On the other hand, an attacker in the
Cloud, with one or several entities, would be described as local.
4. Denial of Service
A DDoS is a DoS that uses a high number of hosts to make the attack even more disruptive.
The number of hosts can reach hundreds of thousands. Most of the time, the machine’s owners
are unaware that their machines were previously infested and corrupted through a Trojan or
a backdoor program.
The actions leading to a DoS or DDoS, the ultimate goal of which is to compromise the availability
of the Cloud, can take place remotely or locally from the victim’s or user’s service. It generally targets
the victim’s communication bandwidth, computational resources, memory buffers, network protocols
or the victim’s application processing logic.
This section specifically addresses DoS and DDoS applied to Cloud Computing networks. DoS and
DDoS are not specific to Cloud networks, but they entirely apply to them.
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Riquet et al. [21] study the impact of DDoS attacks on Cloud Computing with a defense such as
an IDS (snort [22]) and a commercial firewall. Their experiments show that distributed attacks remain
undetected, even with security solutions.
As mentioned in [23], DoS or DDoS attacks on Cloud Computing can be direct or indirect. In direct
attacks, the target service or host machine is predetermined although collateral damages may result in
indirect DoS or DDoSs by denying access to other services hosted on the same machine or network.
There is even a scenario called race in power, induced by a Cloud mechanism that relocates flooded
services to other machines. Cloud elasticity can be used to mitigate the effects of the attack, but it is
entirely possible that it will simply spread the workload, in other words, direct the attack to many
other servers.
Somani et al. [24] demonstrate that DDoS attacks in clouds affect the victim server along with several
other parts: virtual servers on physical servers, network resources, and service providers. They conclude
that these parts could be affected collaterally, even if they are not the actual targets of the attack.
According to [25], a DoS or DDoS attack can have two objectives. The first consists in overwhelming
the target system resources or the network connections, by taking advantage of the superior capacity of
the attacker, compared to what the system is capable of coping with in terms of CPU or bandwidth for
instance. The second consists of exploiting vulnerabilities in the system by sending specific malicious
packets (not necessarily at a huge rate).
4.1. Overwhelm the Resources
4.1.1. Exhausting Memory
Attacks of this category take advantage of vulnerabilities in Internet protocols, routing and
networking devices. They include, for instance, SYN (SYNchronize) flood attacks that consist of
sending many SYN packets, while ignoring the SYN ACK (acknowledgment) packets. Since the
number of simultaneous TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) connections is limited and the server is
waiting for the ACK packets, new users cannot get connected. Such attacks could be avoided with
proxy-based applications for instance. The number of simultaneous TCP connections is then much
higher and it decreases the server’s memory load, since only the connections that have successfully
completed the “three-way handshake” are forwarded to the server.
4.1.2. Exhausting Bandwidth
One way to overwhelm the target system is to exhaust the bandwidth. They aim to flood the
network to prevent legitimate users from accessing the Cloud infrastructures, by imposing greater
traffic than the available bandwidth. In this case, more and more packets are dropped, including the
legitimate ones. An example of such an attack is given in [26]. The first step is to gain access to the
topology (or at least a sufficient amount to reveal useful information such as a bottleneck uplink).
According to the author, an attack has really little chance to succeed if it does not take the topology
of the Cloud into account, and more specifically all of the vulnerable links. The second step is to
take possession of enough hosts in the target subnet and to produce as much UDP traffic as possible
through the vulnerable uplink (by targeting hosts in a specific subnet for instance). The choice of UDP
is motivated by the expected starvation of the legitimate TCP sessions due to the TCP congestion
handling mechanisms. In the case of CPU intensive requests, the system will predominantly process
the malicious packets rather than the legitimate ones.
4.1.3. Exhausting Computing Time/Bandwidth
This attack steals computing time/bandwidth from other users. With Amazon’s Cloud platform
and Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) services, an attacker boots up a massive number of machines.
With a script Twill, multiple accounts are created and run the machines. This recursive registering of
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accounts and booting of machines means that the number of running machines grows exponentially.
This may continue until the system can no longer handle the machine load [27].
4.1.4. Exhausting Computing Time
In oversized payload attacks, an attacker sends an excessively large payload to deplete the victim’s
system resources. Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) messages from an attacker contain a large
amount of references to external entities to force the server to open a large number of TCP connections
to download the actual contents of the entities. Consequently, a large amount of CPU cycles is used to
process the downloaded contents.
4.1.5. XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS
Those attacks belong to the resource exhaustion attack category. EXtensible Markup Language
(XML) (or JSON) and HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) are heavily used in Cloud Computing web
services and very little work has been done to ensure security related to these protocols as, most of
the time, for example with XML (XML encryption, digital signatures, user tokens, etc.), the request is
implicitly assumed to be necessarily legitimate. This puts XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS among the most
destructive DoS and DDoS attacks in Cloud Computing.
As Ye et al. in [28] explain, web services rely on SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) to send
and receive messages. However, SOAP uses XML, which can be used to perpetrate XML-DoS attacks,
based mainly on three strategies. The first uses an oversized payload to deplete the target system
resources. The second is the External Entity DoS Attack. In this attack, the server is forced to resolve
many large external entities (remote XML files) defined within the Document Type Definition (DTD).
This means opening many TCP connections while making extensive use of the CPU to process the
entities. Eventually, the third strategy, the XML Entity Expansion Attack, forces the server to recursively
resolve entities defined within the DTD, which makes intensive usage of the CPU and the memory.
The Coercive Parsing [29] attack is one such example of XML-DoS: it uses a continuous sequence
of opened tags that primarily exhausts both the CPU and the memory. Other forms of coercive parsing
include many namespace declarations, a large prefix, namespace URIs, or very deeply nested XML
structures [30]. However, this attack can only be successful if the web service uses a Document Object
Model (DOM) parser that creates a tree representation of the XML document.
Padmanabhun et al. [31] give an overview of the underlying issues behind XML and how this
can lead to a DoS. They explain how SOAP allows to send and receive XML messages regardless of the
underlying implementation of the application or the transport protocol (HTTP, SMTP, etc.).
An HTTP-DoS consists of sending a lot of arbitrary HTTP requests. HTTP repeats requests and
HTTP recursively attacks a particular web service [30]. A high rate of legitimate or invalid HTTP
packets are sent to the server with the goal of overwhelming the web service resources. Processing all
of the requests and the cost associated with each request (which may be quite significant for certain
web services) eventually triggers the DoS.
4.2. Exploit the Target System’s Vulnerabilities
Antunes et al. [25] give an overview of those attacks and propose a method to automatically and
systematically detect the vulnerabilities that can lead to a DoS or DDoS. Those attacks are perpetrated
by way of a malicious interaction with the target system. This results in either a crash or a service
degradation. This can be caused by a design flaw or a software bug, for instance. As the authors
point out, for system administrators, the factors leading to those kinds of attacks are very difficult to
detect and therefore to be avoided, since the vulnerability may only be leveraged under very specific
conditions or after many activations. They define resource-exhaustion vulnerabilities as “a specific
type of fault that causes the consumption or allocation of some resource in an undefined or unnecessary
way or the failure to release it when no longer needed, eventually causing its depletion”.
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4.3. Section Summary
Figure 1 shows a synthesis of DoS. Because of its very own nature, Cloud Computing is vulnerable
to DoS and DDoS attacks, but it also offers great opportunities to recover quickly from these attacks
since resources can be provisioned very easily and quickly [32]. Hence, at first sight, a DoS or DDoS
attack appears to be harder to implement and its success is not granted given that the attackers need
a lot more resources to achieve their goal in the case where Cloud infrastructures are well designed.
However, service providers should still take those attacks into account; otherwise, Cloud elasticity
would be used to serve huge amounts of illegitimate traffic, which is costly. Moreover, due to the
growing botnet market (e.g., people selling access to infested machines), one cannot presume the
extent of an attacker’s strike force.
Figure 1. List of DoS (Denial-of-Service) and DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks.
5. DoS and DDoS Defense
The available Cloud Computing DoS and DDoS defenses cover various aspects, such as
prevention, mitigation strategies and security architectures (see Table 1). During a DoS and DDoS
attack, the most important thing is to maintain the availability for the service providers, the end users
and the Cloud infrastructure managers.
Defending against DoS and DDoS attacks is difficult. A DoS or DDoS could theoretically be
stopped by identifying and then blocking the unique source of the attack. Most of the time, the attack
leverages a huge amount of bots through a DDoS attack.
Table 1. Cloud Computing DoS (Denial-of-Service) and DDoS Defenses.
Techniques
Defense Strategy
Prevention Service Level Agreement
Attack
Mitigation
Virtual Machine Monitor
Intrusion Detection System
IDS
Firewall
Detection
Filter
Limitation
TraceBack
Architecture
Trust Delegation
Reputation
Intrusion Detection System
(IDS)
Firewall
Cryptography
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5.1. Prevention
Service Level Agreements (SLA). SLA helps to prevent DoS and DDoS attacks. Kandukuri et al. [33]
demonstrate the necessity of an exhaustive and standardized SLA, which is the only legal agreement
between a client and the service provider for availability, confidentiality and trust. An SLA can take
care of the following: (1) privileged user access, that assures the customer outsourced sensitive data do
not fall into malicious hands; (2) regulatory compliance, that holds the customer ultimately responsible
for his own data, and subjects the service provider to external audits and security certifications; (3) data
location, that is a commitment to comply to the local jurisdiction and to store and process data in
specific jurisdictions only and (4) data segregation: data must be properly encrypted to avoid leakages
between users sharing the same environment. The authors also provide a list of questions that SLA
must answer.
5.2. Attack Mitigation
To eradicate an attack, there are five general requirements [18]. First, detect the attack as quickly
as possible and determine its magnitude (determine the impact and their level of significance). Second,
try to mitigate the effects of the attack as much as possible. Third, if step two is not sufficient enough
or impossible, migrate the VM under attack to safe physical servers. In order to do so, there is
a fourth requirement guaranteeing network bandwidth. Eventually, put an end to the attack with
countermeasures that rank from very basic to highly complex. Whatever the measure, it will not be
perfect for every situation. Often a compromise must be made when choosing one or another.
As a general rule, to prevent such attacks, the resources allocated to users must be limited to a bare
minimum. For authenticated users, it is possible to establish quotas to limit the load a particular user
can put on the system. In particular, one might consider handling only a single request per user at one
given time, by synchronizing the users’ sessions. However, this solution remains problematic due to
the choice of quotas and the resulting quality of service for the end user, as it may deteriorate. A more
efficient solution would be to dynamically use the scalability of Cloud infrastructures to maintain
availability while the attack is being eradicated.
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). Zhao et al. [34] propose a VMM composed of a tagger,
a duplicator and a detector. The goal is to monitor and compute the amount of available resources and
to compare it to a threshold to detect the presence of an attack. Since the VMM has greater privileges
than the guest operating system, it can monitor and evaluate the guest’s performance. When under
attack, the OS and all the applications are moved to a new isolated entity. During the migration process,
there is no service interruption for the user under attack since the applications are still running in both
the original VM and in the new isolated VM. Basically, the only difference with duplication is that the
original VM is destroyed when the migration is complete. This way, the attack has no more influence
on the user’s applications. The difficulty is to correctly set the threshold value that indicates an attack.
Another difficulty lies in the fact that the VMM exists whether or not there is an attack. Thus, most of
the time, it is likely to be idle. However, the advantage of this system is the possibility to migrate the
VM without interrupting the service which is a significant advantage of this system. There is no need
to migrate the entire VM, only the selected applications and OS.
Alarif et al. [35] define a strategy to detect the attack using DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform)
to collect the workload signals of co-resident VMs. If the correlation between signals is higher than
normal and keeps increasing with time, it strong indicates that an internal DoS attack is underway.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). An IDS can be used in VMs. IDS can be classified in
two categories [36]: Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) and Network-based Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS). For HIDS, the detection applies for a specific host, whereas an NIDS is
used for all the traffic inside a particular network. Bakshi et al. [37] propose IDSs installed on the
virtual switch. With the analysis of inbound-outbound traffic, the IDS blocks the intruder’s addresses.
They suppose that the IP addresses are not spoofing.
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IDS, Behavior and Knowledge Analysis. Vieira et al. [38] propose an architecture (node, service,
event auditor, storage service) for IDS to examine network traffic, log files and user behaviours.
Each node must alert other nodes when an attack occurs. A node contains the resources (through
middleware), the service provides functionality, the event auditor monitors the data to analyze and
the storage service uses behavior and knowledge analysis: data mining, artificial neural networks,
artificial immunological systems and expert systems. Data from both the logs and the communication
systems are used to evaluate the Knowledge-Based System. A series of rules was created to build
a security policy that should be respected.
IDS and Cloud Fusion Unit. Lonea et al. [39] propose a solution to combine IDSs deployed
in VMs of the Cloud system with a data fusion methodology at the front-end using the Dempster’s
combination rule (Dempster–Shafer Theory DST). The IDSs are installed and configured in each VM.
A MySQL database is installed in the Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU) of the front-end server. An alert
in IDSs will be stored in the database. The Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU) comprises three components:
a MySQL database (storing the alerts), basic probabilities assignment calculation operations and attacks
assessment. Their solution is not associated with any experimentation.
IDS and Queueing Theory. Yu et al. [40] propose an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) between
a Cloud data center and the internet to monitor incoming packets. To mitigate DoS or DDoS attacks
on individual Cloud customers, the mechanism will automatically and dynamically allocate extra
resources from the available Cloud resources pool. A queuing theory is used to estimate the resource
allocation. The mitigation problem is an optimization problem: minimizing the resource investment
(CPU, memory, IO, bandwidth) while guaranteeing the average time in the system of packets.
However, some statements in the paper are false: (1) the attack capability of a botnet is usually
limited. Consequently, the authors find it reasonable to expect that a Cloud can manage its reserved or
idle resources to meet demand; (2) all attack packets are filtered and all legitimate packets go through
the IPS system.
Firewalls. Modi et al. [36] explain that firewalls protect the front access points of Clouds and are
treated as the first line of defense. Firewalls filter (1) by inspecting only header information such as
source or destination address and the port number; (2) with a state table (request and server responses);
and (3) by analyzing the protocol syntax by breaking off the client/server connection.
Ismail et al. [41] propose a framework that web servers in virtual machine access by internet
gateway and virtual switch. With a covariance matrix of normal traffic, the virtual switch can find the
IP addresses from where the attacks originated. Then, the virtual switch blocks the IP addresses that
perpetrated the attacks with a honeypot network. The authors suppose that the IP addresses at the
origin of the attacks are not spoofing.
Clusterized firewall. Liu et al. [42] propose a clusterized firewall framework for Cloud Computing.
They divide the Cloud services into application layers in which the servers are grouped into clusters,
for a type of Cloud data service center. Each cluster has a firewall. The firewall for each cluster protects
applications according to the arrival rate and thus guarantees QoS for legitimate users. Each cluster
can be modeled as an M/G/1 queueing system to obtain the key measures: (1) the request response
time and (2) how many resources are needed to guarantee the QoS. These key metrics evaluated the
Cloud defense.
Statistical machine learning. With statistical machine learning techniques, Khoshed et al. [13]
propose a Support Vector Machine technique to identify top attacks. It should also warn the system
administrators and data owners of the type of attack and suggest possible actions to take. Eventually,
customers would be aware of the attack type even if Cloud providers are reluctant to divulge
information about the attack.
Traceback and Cloud filter. Yang et al. [43] propose an SOA-based tracing approach to trace
the true DDoS source and filter it. The SOA is placed before the Web server and all requests for the
service are marked by the SOA-Based Traceback Approach (SBTA). An algorithm for determining the
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reconstruction of the path makes it possible to find the true source of attack. The attack messages are
then filtered by the Cloud.
Infrastructure. Amazon Web Services (AWS) [44] proposes an Infrastructure Layer Defense and
an Application Layer Defense against DDoS. The Infrastructure Layer defense (1) uses a resizable
compute capacity; (2) chooses AWS Regions for optimal latency and throughput; (3) considers Elastic
Load Balancing (ELB); (4) uses a content delivery network (CDN) service and (5) uses a scalable
domain name system (DNS) service. The Application Layer defense uses Web application firewalls to
protect the vulnerabilities within the application, or to block the unknown source IP addresses, URI,
query string, HTTP method, or header key.
5.3. Security Architecture
A security architecture involves several elements: servers, switch controller, protocols, router
and applications.
Security Aware Cloud Architecture. Hwang et al. [45] highlight that the abstraction level of the
Cloud model (SaaS being the most abstract and IaaS being the least abstract) influences the number
of security aspects that will be handled by the provider (more abstraction means the provider will
be in charge of more security aspects). In the intermediate case of PaaS, users remain in charge of
confidentiality and data privacy, yet the provider is responsible for data integrity and availability.
Generally speaking, they propose a Security Aware Cloud Architecture that offers protection to secure
public Clouds and data centers. The mechanisms are (1) trust delegation and negotiation architecture;
(2) worm containment and DDoS defense; (3) reputation system of resource sites; (4) fine-grain access
control and (5) collusive privacy prevention. No tests assess the performance of their architecture.
DDoS Attack Mitigation Architecture: DaMask. Wang et al. [46] propose a DDoS attack
mitigation architecture. The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an approach that allows network
administrators to manage network services by way of abstraction of lower-level functionality.
The authors find that the SDN and Cloud Computing can enhance the DDoS attack defense.
The DaMask architecture has three layers: network switches, network controllers and network
applications. There are two separate modules: (1) DaMask-D, a network attack detection system,
and (2) DaMask-M, an attack reaction module. DaMask-D already has an efficient attack detection
algorithm with a very low overhead. DaMask-M defines three basic operations: forward, drop and
modify the packet. Those operations are implemented as a set of APIs. Consequently, the defenders
can customize the countermeasures.
Security Architecture based on Defense. Mavroeidakos et al. [47] propose the security architecture
composed of different types of firewalls that cooperate in defense zones. It includes a set of layers:
(1) the perimeter defense; (2) the deceptive; (3) the detection and (4) the cryptography. The security
mechanisms proposed in each layer are implemented in the defense zones and collaborate to protect
the data. The perimeter defense consists of a border router and two stateful firewalls. Between the
provided service and the rest of the Internet, this defense provides the core security functionality
to protect the classified data in defense zones. The deceptive layer operate in every defense zone with
a honeynet to identify new attacks and vulnerabilities of their systems. The detection layer consists
of IDSs that analyze the network traffic with a predefined rule set. The cryptography layer into the
cloud environment is the elliptic curve cryptography. This attacks the following: address spoofing,
tiny fragment attacks, buffer overflows, port scans, OS fingerprinting, web attacks, Trojan attacks,
viruses and worms, insider threats, attacks on virtualization, DoS and DDoS attacks, which are
mitigated by a number of security components in the architecture. The authors do not evaluate the
cost of implementing such an architecture.
Latanicki et al. [18] propose a federated cloud architecture to use migration of virtual machines
to defense against cloud DDoS attacks. The architecture is composed of (1) Scalable Cloud DDoS
Probe Manager that is responsible for monitoring the user Internet access; (2) Scalable Cloud DDoS
Correlation Analysis Manager is responsible for performing correlation analysis in each Cloud
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infrastructure; (3) DDoS Cloud Migration Manager is responsible for the availability by migrating the
attacked Virtual Machine to physical machines not under DDoS attack; and (4) DDoS Cloud ReRoute
Manager is responsible for the network interconnections.
Hybrid Firewalling Architecture. Guenane et al. [48] present a DDoS mitigation service using
an innovative architecture that provides hybrid (Physical and Virtual) cloud-based firewalling services.
The physical firewalls represent the physical IT-security infrastructure of the company. The mitigation
service aims at redirecting or load balancing the traffic which is redirected to virtual firewalls.
The virtual firewalls reside on virtual machines and execute several operations such as analysis,
monitoring, and reporting.
(1) The Communication Module performs the authentication and establishment of a secure tunnel
between the physical and virtual firewalls.
(2) The Decision Strategy Module determines if traffic must be transferred to virtual firewalls in order
to decrease the overload on physical ones. This decision depends on the information provided by
the Monitoring System and Monitoring Network modules such as CPU, memory and throughput.
(3) The Load Balancing Module receives its orders from the Decision Strategy Module. It interacts
with the Authentication Module that provides it with trusted information (IP-address and
port number).
(4) The Monitoring Module is constantly polling the virtual firewall to get an accurate overview of
software and network status.
(5) The Evaluation Module aims at evaluating the status of the virtual firewall that is provided by
the Monitoring Module by aggregating different related parameters.
5.4. Defenses against XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS Attacks
Filtering Tree. Karnwal et al. [49] developed a filtering tree, which works like a service. The XML
consumer request is converted into a tree form and uses a virtual Cloud defender to defend against
these types of attacks. The Cloud defender basically consists of five steps: sensor filtering (check
number of messages from a particular user), hop count filtering (number of nodes crossed from source
to destination—this cannot be forged by the attacker), IP frequency divergence (the same range of IP
addresses is suspect), puzzle (it sends a puzzle to a particular user: if it is not resolved, the packet is
suspect) and double signature. The first four filters detect HTTP-DDoS attacks while the fifth filter
detects XML-DDoS attacks.
Limitation. Karthigeyan et al. [50] explain that an acceptable solution to prevent attackers from
exhausting the victims’ network bandwidth and computing power is to route the requests to the
service providers only once they have been authenticated and validated. First, limit the payload size.
Then, limit the time allocated to a SOAP request. Third, limit the number of requests a particular user
can send within a given time frame. Packets that do not match those criteria are discarded and the
service is blocked for the user for a certain period of time. They also propose to impose limits for
the XML parser. For example, limit the number of attributes an element can have, the quantity of
bytes in a XML message, the depth of nested elements and the size of all nodes in the XML document.
Furthermore, to minimize the impact on the QoS for the end user in terms of delays, for instance,
this could take place only when the system is under attack, which is detected by the service provider.
Cloud Protector and Decision Theory. Chonka et al. [51,52] developed a Cloud Traceback (CTB),
which uses a Service-Oriented Traceback Architecture (SOTA) approach. CTB is deployed at the edge
routers in order to be close to the Cloud network source end to mark all outgoing packets. If an
attack is detected, the use of a back propagation neutral network, called Cloud Protector, allows for
retrieving the source of the attack. The Cloud Protector is a trained back propagation neural network,
which means that there is a set of connected units associated with a given weight, spread between
input, hidden and output layers. Then, the weights are added to see if the result exceeds a certain
threshold, which means an attack is taking place. They also developed a method relying on decision
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theory, called ENDER (Pre-Decision, Advance Decision and Learning System). It uses two decision
theory methods to detect attack traffic and mark the attack messages. If an attack message is detected,
a Reconstruct And Drop (RAD) system removes the message before a victim is harmed.
Defense in Cloud Broker. Vissers et al. [30] divide the concept of Cloud Computing into three
parts. First, the Cloud providers deploy the VM and their web services. Then, the Cloud broker
makes the link between the user and the available resources of the Cloud providers in order to
allocate the necessary resources. Users request resources in the Cloud infrastructure through the
Cloud broker to eventually use the web services hosted by the Cloud providers. As the author points
out, the Cloud broker introduces a single point of failure, since its unavailability makes the Cloud
infrastructure unusable. To make this architecture more secure, a DDoS defense system is placed with
the Cloud broker to decide whether the application request should be rejected or not. The defense
system, which uses DDoS datasets, is incorporated into all the broker entities. The filter is based on
the definition of a normal profile usage constructed with previous requests. The filter, aimed to be
scalable to overcome a DDoS, is transparent for the user. A request must go through the HTTP header
filtering (HTTP floods, non-existing SOAP Action usage and content-length outliers) and then through
actual XML content filtering (SOAP feature outlier detection and SOAP Action or WS-Addressing
spoofing). This defense mechanism has proved to be successful at detecting and mitigating all listed
vulnerabilities. In addition, it might even be able to handle unknown vulnerabilities with minimal
time overhead.
Flexible, Collaborative, Multilayer, DDoS Prevention Framework (FCMDPF). Saleh et al. [53]
propose a framework composed of (1) an Outer attack Blocking (OB) at the edge router; (2) a Service
Traceback Oriented Architecture (STBOA); (3) and a flexible advanced entropy based (FAEB) layer.
From a blacklist database table (IP source), the OB layer blocks or forwards the incoming request.
The STBOA layer is designed to validate whether the incoming request is launched by a human
(real web browser) or by an automated tool (bots). A puzzle or random number is sent to the client or
the requester to solve. After verification, if the puzzle or random number are correct, the request is
forwarded to the next level. Otherwise, it is immediately blocked and a blacklist is updated. The FAEB
layer computes entropy of overall requests to determine flash crowds or HTTP attacks. The entropy
of incoming requests that are launched towards hot pages of the website determines the flash crowd.
In the case of an HTTP attack, the blacklist is updated. The disadvantage of this framework lies in the
information on the blacklist and its updates.
Using CAPTCHA to Mitigate HTTP-DoS Attacks. Sairam et al. [54] propose an architecture to
migrate HTTP-DoS attacks with (1) a feature extractor; (2) a clustering unit; (3) a workload calculator
and (4) a filter. With a navigation log, the extractor module extracts: browsing length ratio, average
stay time and the HTTP request rate to identify user groups. Every T interval, the clustering module
samples the user traffic. Experiments show that for T = 15 min offers a good performance. By using the
clustering report, the workload calculator computes the size and density of each cluster. The load is
calculated both with the computational overhead (pageload factor) and the network bandwidth usage
(number of bytes transferred for each request). Finally, if the workload exceeds a certain threshold,
for each cluster, the filter provides a mechanism to filter traffic from such sources. The difficulty is to
set the value of threshold as it should be proportional to the capacity of the web server. If the workload
exceeds a threshold and a cluster is highly dense, then the users are suspected to be bots. The potential
attackers are then challenged with a CAPTCHA to eliminate false positives.
5.5. Section Summary
The defenses to protect the Cloud availability need some information: blacklist, the normal profile,
threshold determination and limit fixation. Hence, if those information values are wrong, the defenses
can lead to false positives or negatives.
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6. How to Evaluate Defense Systems
The proposed defenses for DDoS attacks must prove their efficiency. For this purpose, research
authors must design experiments and determine metrics to assess performance. Table 2 lists all
the information for the proposed defenses. Some defenses are compared with others. However,
the following authors have tried to implement, simulate and test their proposed solutions.
Table 2. Summary of Evaluation Defense System in DDoS Attacks.
Experiment Efficiency
Design Impact of defense system
Data collection Overhead bandwith
Simulation Processing time
Testbed Detection attack
False alarm
False negative
Parameters Mitigation
Attack Rate Filtration
Attack Duration Limitation
Quality of Serviice (QoS)
Migration Virtual Machine (VM)
Traceback
6.1. Theoretical Evaluation
Zhao et al. [34] propose to monitor the VM’s available resources to decide if it is under attack,
in which case the system selectively duplicates tagged applications and operating systems. Their defense
system has yet to be tested, but the authors have identified four benefits and one disadvantage with
this method. The isolated environment exists whether or not there is an attack, so that most of the time
it is likely to be idle. From a performance point of view, they show that their system is not necessarily
more costly than VM migration. As far as performance is concerned, they theoretically evaluate the
total time consumption of their defense system.
6.2. Data Collection
Vieira et al. [38] propose a refinement to traditional IDS to be more efficient in a Cloud environment.
To test their system, they use three sets of data. The first represents legitimate actions. In the second,
they altered the services and their usage frequency to simulate anomalies. The last set simulates
policy violations. In order to evaluate the event auditor that monitors the requests received and
the responses sent on a node, they chose to examine the communication elements, since log data
present little variations, making attacks difficult to detect. A feed-forward neural network is used for
the behavior-based technique, and the simulation includes five legitimate users and five intruders.
Their scenario simulates ten days of usage. Although the results yielded a high number of false
negatives and positives, its performance improved when the training period of the neural network
was prolonged. To evaluate their behavior-based system, they looked for the number of false positives
and negatives. They show that their system consistently has more false negatives than false positives.
With still a high level of uncertainty, the false alarms disappeared within 16 days of simulation
training. With longer training periods, they noticed even lower false positives, but also the very
non-deterministic nature of neural networks, since false positives were not stable after several iterations.
To evaluate the Knowledge-Based System, they used data from both the logs and the communication
system. They created a series of rules to build a security policy that should be respected. They conclude
that their system could allow real time analyses, provided the number of rules per action remains low.
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6.3. Simulation
Liu et al. [42] use three parameters: the attack rate, the attack duration and the rule processing
time. They showed that a larger matching probability (that is to say rules that are easier to match)
means a reduced response time. Hence, they encouraged Cloud defenders to put those rules at the
top of the rules list so as to increase users’ satisfaction. They demonstrated, both analytically and
experimentally, a direct correlation between the response time and the number of rules and attack rates.
To estimate the cost of their system, they rented 20 VMs from Amazon EC2. In the end, running their
clusterized firewall turned out to cost 38 US/day and 266 US/week, while keeping in mind that long
attacks are extremely rare, given that they are easily detected.
6.4. Testbed
Wang et al. [46] set up a hybrid Cloud, using Amazon EC2 as a public Cloud and simulating
a private Cloud in their lab. The private Cloud consists of two Linux machines, one of which hosting
DaMask and the network controller while the other emulates a virtual network to extend the private
Cloud. They wanted to measure the communication costs as well as the computation overhead of
DaMask. They began by computing the network bandwidth between the private and the public Cloud,
with and without DaMask. For the communication overhead, caused by the traffic being examined by
DaMask, they showed the overhead was a constant if the link status of network remained stable. As for
the computation overhead caused by the detection algorithm, they ended up with an interference time
of 80 ms, which they consider quite efficient.
Chonka et al. [51] evaluated their Cloud Traceback (CTB) and Cloud Protector in multiple ways.
They conducted experiments to see how CTB marked packets and could determine if they led to a
XML-DoS, but also how accurate CTB was at identifying the source of the attack. Moreover, they wanted
to make sure their method was better than traditional security mechanisms such as WS-Security, when
it comes to XML-DoS attacks. The experimentation for the Cloud Protector consisted in determining
if it could detect and filter HTTP-DoS and XML-DoS messages. To generate the attack traffic, they
opened up three virtual servers that contained 20 Firefox browsers and 20 open tabs to each browser,
in addition to a page refresher tool and targeted a particular website. First, they studied the impact
of the attack without their architecture and witnessed its tremendous and lasting effect as the web
server was quickly unable to handle more than a few requests. Then, they divided the evaluation of
CTB in two parts: one to simulate XML-DoS attacks against a web server and the other to compare
CTB to traditional mechanisms. In their simulation, 100 messages were sent. If one was an XML-DoS
attack, it was supposed to crash the server with a probability of 1/2. Out of those 100 messages,
nine successfully crashed the server and CTB was able to identify seven of them, with a response time
that varied between 480 and 550 ms. When comparing CTB with SOAP authentication, CTB proved
to be far more effective in terms of response time and the same was true for WS-Security. Then,
they assessed the performance of the Cloud Protector (a neural network) by training and testing
it with a dataset they developed. On the trained dataset for HTTP-DoS, the Cloud Protector was
able to identify 91% of the attack (9% of false positives), but with significantly different response
times (between 20 ms and 1 s). On the test dataset, the accuracy decreased to 88%, with the same
variation in response time. For XML-DoS, most of the attack messages were identified, detecting and
removing them taking between 10 and 140 ms, but the response times were not as scattered as in the
HTTP-DoS case.
In [52], Chonka et al. came up with a new defense system called ENDER, that has no more than
1% of false positives on the same dataset.
Vissers et al. [30] used the Eucalyptus middleware to manage resources in their experiment.
The Cloud Resource Broker along with the DDoS defense system is installed on a four CPU server.
Then, they set up Eucalyptus and the web services. They wanted to assess the impact of the
attack, the mitigation capabilities of their system and the cost induced by this defense mechanism
(extra response time). When the defense system was not present, a flooding attack with 4900 legitimate
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requests during 60 s was enough to exhaust the CPU, whereas with the defense system, only the first
request was accepted and the others were discarded as they exceeded the request rate. Moreover,
some addresses were blacklisted. All in all, 10% of CPU was necessary to drop malicious packets.
With an oversized XML attack, ten 12 MB messages were sufficient to keep the CPU busy for 15 min,
while also significantly increasing memory usage. With the defense system, the CPU load was only
around 10% for 20 s, while blocking the attack, and without additional memory usage. The mechanism
also successfully handled a coercive parsing attack, an oversize encryption attack and a spoofing attack.
To evaluate the response time of their system, they sent 200 SOAP requests at a rate of two requests per
second and then 10,000 SOAP requests at 50 requests per second, both with and without the filter in
place. In the first load, introducing the defense system made the processing time of the web service go
from 3 to 5 ms, whereas in the high load, it went from 3 to 9 ms. Those results outperform the current
existing solutions (for example, the Cloud Protector mentioned above).
Saleh et al. [53] conducted four experiments. First, they evaluated how the framework could
protect against flash crowd attacks, then against high rate DDoS attacks. Third, they studied the
ability to validate clients and trace the true IP source of the attack. Eventually, they evaluated the
proper blocking of the attacking IP address as close as possible to the network entrance. They used
the following parameters to make the evaluations: the number of incoming requests and number of
detected and prevented attacks against the web application (conducted by way of the Apache log,
based on the response code number to the incoming request—an error code means the attack was
detected). Finally, 420,000 incoming requests were generated to cause a DDoS. The AntiDDoS_Shield
system detected and prevented all high rate HTTP-based DoS/DDoS attacks: 369,726 out of 420,000
flash crowd (FC) attacks, at the edge router. AntiDDoS_Shield system succeeded in validating and
tracing back 369,726 out of 420,000 incoming requests.
In summary, apart from defense architectures that have no evaluations whatsoever, most defenses
came with experiments on design and performance, whether theoretical or practical. By using
several sets of data and carefully choosing the parameters of interest, the authors were able to
study the response of their system under different workloads, while reproducing real-life situations.
They discussed the possibility of adopting their system regarding the cost, scenario (real time),
best practices (how to correctly set up the system for maximal performance), overhead, precision (rate of
false positives or negatives), effectiveness to detect and filter attack messages and ability to detect new
attacks. Halabi et al. [55] propose a survey and a taxonomy to evaluate the defense against DoS and
DDoS attacks in Cloud Computing.
7. Conclusions
Being a combination of existing technologies such as VM, web services, servers, network links,
etc., this new paradigm Cloud Computing comes with known vulnerabilities, but also new kinds of
attacks because of the innovative way services are presented to the user and because of the growing
success and adoption of Cloud Computing, both by companies and individuals. Taking advantage of
its great scalability and elasticity, Cloud Computing apparently offers adequate resistance to attacks.
This review proves that many attacks can still cause great harm to Cloud Computing, impacting all the
important security aspects (confidentiality, integrity, isolation, availability, etc.). Among those attacks,
the DoS and DDoS attacks are arguably the easiest to mount and the most destructive, yet huge gaps
still exist to efficiently deal with those attacks. We presented some state-of-the-art solutions: some
were rather easy to incorporate in existing Cloud infrastructures for Cloud providers to prevent or
reduce DoS and DDoS attacks. However, some solutions could not detect nor perfectly mitigate all
the possible attacks. Others were much more efficient, albeit much more complex. In all cases, and as
always in the security field, no solution is perfect. Eventually, it all comes down to what compromise
the system administrators are willing to make. We also gave an original focus on the different facets of
the attack and attacker applied to Cloud Computing, a key parameter to know in order to provide the
best security solutions. The extensive study of XML-DoS and HTTP-DoS allowed for showing all of the
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available countermeasures. In addition, DoS and DDoS defenses are evaluated with the appropriate
metrics and experimental design.
For the cloud provider, this survey of DoS and DDoS attack and defenses can help to define a
Security Service Level Agreements (Security-SLAs), as the protection of the fundamental security
attributes is defined by the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability).
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